

Original Article

Crime prevention through environmental design (CPTED) and the New South Wales crime risk assessment guidelines: A critical review

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Abstract Crime prevention through environmental design (CPTED) guidelines have been adopted in Australia and internationally. In 2001 CPTED guidelines were introduced in New South Wales (NSW). Since their introduction there has been little discussion or scholarly analysis of these guidelines. This article seeks to address this gap through a critical analysis of the NSW guidelines and related crime risk assessment reports. On the basis of this analysis, we argue that the guidelines provide limited direction for the compilation of crime risk assessment reports and little guidance to local authorities (that is councils) assessing development applications. The existing guidelines are based on four CPTED concepts, which limits assessment of crime risks and the lack of diagrams, photos or illustrations reduces their overall utility. While the introduction of the guidelines triggered an increased focus on ways to design out crime, our research suggests the guidelines require revision. Guidelines from other Australian jurisdictions (such as Victoria) provide a potential model for how the NSW guidelines could be improved.

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Introduction

Crime prevention through environmental design (CPTED) guidelines have been adopted as part of the development process in numerous jurisdictions across Australia. The aims of this article are to assess the form and operation of the guidelines in New South Wales (NSW). This assessment is underpinned by an analysis of crime risk assessment reports from the same jurisdiction. While these reports are assessed in more detail elsewhere (Clancey *et al*, 2011), here they merely provide a vehicle to analyse the NSW guidelines.

This article is structured as follows. First, we provide an overview of CPTED and its development in order to explain its centrality to the NSW guidelines. Second, we outline the NSW guidelines as they currently stand, summarising what we see as their key principles. Third, we provide a brief overview of the crime risk assessment reports that underpin our analysis of the guidelines. Fourth, we analyse and problematise the guidelines using text from the crime risk assessment reports and make comparison with the Victorian CPTED guidelines. The Victorian guidelines provide a clear, well illustrated exposition of CPTED concepts and design principles.

While this article specifically focuses on the NSW experience, the observations presented here will be relevant to other jurisdictions in reinforcing the merits or otherwise of approaches adopted elsewhere.

Crime Prevention through Environmental Design

CPTED is defined as the ‘proper design and effective use of the built environment’, which ‘can lead to a reduction in the fear and incidence of crime, and an improvement in the quality of life’ (Crowe, 2000, p. 46). The form of the physical environment can prevent crime by blocking opportunities through creating obstacles or barriers to targets, can eliminate places for concealment, restrict escape routes and increase the surveillance of would-be offenders (Rosenbaum *et al*, 1998, pp. 125–126).

Proponents and practitioners of CPTED highlight a plethora of techniques that can be utilised to ensure the ‘proper design and effective use of the built environment’. Providing ‘eyes on the street’ or natural surveillance is one such technique. Jane Jacobs’ suggested that ‘... the sidewalk and street peace of cities is not kept primarily by the police, necessary as police are. It is kept primarily by an intricate, almost unconscious, network of voluntary controls and standards among the people themselves, and enforced by the people themselves’ (1961, pp. 32–33). This observation has given rise to design practices that seek to increase the ability for people to see and be seen. Improved street lighting, landscaping that promotes visibility, porous fences, the use of glass and clear plastic in bus shelters and apartment entrance ways, activation at street-level through alfresco dining, and mixed use developments that result in

greater pedestrian traffic throughout the day and night are just some of the methods adopted to promote natural surveillance.

Oscar Newman (1972) developed the concept of 'defensible space'. Legibility and demarcation of land ownership signals transition from public to private space. Greater management of and vigilance over an area arises from clear ownership. Fences and signs can mark out privately owned property, which sends cues about appropriate behaviours in particular locations. Where there is uncertainty regarding ownership, purpose of use and responsibility for management, there is less capacity for capable guardianship and greater potential for criminal activity to occur. Newman's concept of 'defensible space' has become a key plank of CPTED practice.

Stopping or restricting access to particular areas is another common CPTED principle. Access control has been practiced since the beginning of the built form (Cozens, 2008). Moats, fences, gated doors and isolated buildings have been some of the methods of preventing entry. Modern forms of access control build on these historical concepts and include boom gates, bollards, alarms, swipe cards, biometric access, electronic surveillance of entrances, demarcated uses within buildings and other strategies designed to restrict access. Less technologically advanced measures can also restrict or channel movement, including through the use of landscaping, public art and water features. It is argued, that by reducing the opportunities to offend and the rewards of offending (Cornish and Clarke, 2003), access control measures can prevent crime.

The image of an area can influence how it will be used (Crowe, 2000). Given that the sight of people attracts other people (Jacobs, 1961), a vibrant, well-maintained area that has a reputation for being enjoyable and safe will draw in people. This activation will promote passive surveillance, as people come and go, stay and watch, and move around an area. This increases the risks involved in for potential offenders (Cornish and Clarke, 2003). Consequently, the design of public places can serve to support activity, but also promote passive surveillance. For example, playgrounds can attract children and families into an area; sporting or exercise facilities can encourage cycling and jogging; facilities to support music and performance can attract audiences; and busking and street performance influence the mood of a crowd. These activities can be supported by design features and are generally known as space management.

While some argue that there is increasing evidence demonstrating the success of CPTED (Cozens *et al*, 2005; Haywood *et al*, 2009; Armitage *et al*, 2011), criticisms linger. Shaftoe and Read (2005, p. 250) suggest that 'there is much common sense in a "designing out crime" approach, but also a danger of overstating its impact'. They point to examples of well designed areas with high crime and poorly designed areas with low crime in the United Kingdom. They also suggest that some CPTED concepts (such as symbolic barriers) have not been evaluated in any systematic way. Moreover, Sutton *et al* (2008) suggest that 'attempts to enhance territoriality (i.e. attitudes

among legitimate residents and users that promote ownership of space, and encourages them to assert control over it) may only be effective in neighbourhoods that are characterised by high levels of home ownership' (2008, p. 65). Shaftoe (2004) suggests that it is possible that offenders do not get the messages or cues sent by symbolic barriers. He states that 'defensible space and natural surveillance concepts rely on psychological signals ... [that o]utlaws, macho risk-takers and the heavily intoxicated are unlikely to read, or take heed of, these signals' (2004, pp. 78–79).

Despite these and other criticisms, CPTED has gained increasing traction over the last few decades (Minnery and Lim, 2005; Atlas, 2008; Cozens, 2008; Sutton *et al*, 2008). Many police and local authority staff now receive CPTED training (Kelpczarek, 2003; McDonald and Kitteringham, 2004; Cozens *et al*, 2008; Book and Schneider, 2010; McCauley and Opie, no date); rating systems for some forms of built environment operate in some jurisdictions to quantify safety and security (for example, the Secured by Design accreditation process in the United Kingdom); CPTED practitioner professional associations have emerged (for example, the International CPTED Association); and many planning regimes incorporate CPTED design principles (Australian Capital Territory Government, 2000; Office of the Deputy Prime Minister, 2004; South Australian Department of Transport and Urban, 2004; New Zealand Ministry of Justice, 2005; Victorian Department of Sustainability and Environment, 2005; Scottish Executive Planning Department, 2006; Western Australian Planning Commission, 2006; Queensland Government, 2007).

Indeed, in many jurisdictions, the most obvious embodiment of CPTED is through the creation and ratification of specific design guidelines that influence the way that the built environment is developed. Such design guidelines were introduced in NSW in 2001.

The NSW Guidelines¹

In April 2001, the then Department of Urban Affairs and Planning (DUAP) introduced Crime prevention and the assessment of development applications: Guidelines under section 79c of the Environmental Planning and Assessment Act 1979 (five pages of text). These guidelines were intended to 'help councils [i.e. local authorities] identify crime risk and minimise opportunities for crime through the appropriate assessment of development proposals' (DUAP, 2001, p. 1). The guidelines suggest that 'Councils have an obligation to ensure that a development provides safety and security to users and the community' (emphasis in original) (DUAP, 2001, p. 2). Where a development presents a crime risk, the 'guidelines can be used to justify:

- Modification of the development to minimise the risk of crime; or
- Refusal of the development on the grounds that crime risk cannot be appropriately minimised' (DUAP, 2001, p. 2).

The guidelines contain two parts – Part A describes a crime risk assessment (one page), while Part B outlines key CPTED principles (two pages). Councils should consider the principles outlined in Part B when assessing all developments. Key provisions of these two parts are reproduced here as context for later analysis and discussion.

Part A defines a crime risk assessment as being a ‘systematic evaluation of the potential for crime in an area. It provides an indication of both the likely magnitude of crime and likely crime type. The consideration of these dimensions (crime amount and types) will determine the choice and appropriate mix of CPTED strategies’ (DUAP, 2001, p. 3). The guidelines then state that there are two key steps when assessing crime risk: (1) ‘obtain an understanding of the crime risk of the area, and if required (2) apply (CPTED) treatments that correspond with levels of risk present in the area’ (DUAP, 2001, p. 3). It is the stated that:

These guidelines outline how councils are to assess crime risk in local developments. They are not sufficient in themselves, however, to inform councils how to conduct crime risk assessments. To gain a detailed understanding of how to conduct crime risk assessments and how to apply CPTED, *council planners need to attend approved training courses.* (emphasis in original) (DUAP, 2001, p. 3)

Formal crime risk assessments will be required for any development posing crime risks (in the council’s opinion) and would include ‘a new/refurbished shopping centre or transport interchange, a large scale residential development (more than 20 dwellings), or the development/re-development of a mall or other public place, including the installation of new street furniture’ (DUAP, 2001, p. 2). The guidelines encourage councils and police to develop a local consultation protocol stipulating which developments would require a formal crime risk assessment and state that ‘typically, crime risk assessments are conducted in cooperation with trained local police’ (DUAP, 2001, p. 2).

Beyond this direction, the guidelines also suggest that ‘when conducting individual crime risk assessments, the consequences and likelihood of crime are identified and measured using recorded crime statistics, hotspot analyses and Australian Bureau of Statistics (ABS) socio-economic data’ (DUAP, 2001, p. 3). This is, in effect, the total direction provided in relation to crime risk assessments.

Part B of the guidelines essentially provide definitions and examples of the four CPTED principles ‘that need to be used in the assessment of development applications to minimise the opportunity for crime’ (DUAP, 2001, p. 4). These principles are *surveillance*, *access control*, *territorial reinforcement* and *space management*.

Crime Risk Assessment Reports

As outlined above crime risk assessments are required for new/refurbished shopping centre or transport interchange, large-scale residential developments (more than 20 new dwellings), or the development or re-development of a mall or other public place (DUAP, 2001). Following the designation of a development as a 'major project' under section 3A of the *Environmental Planning and Assessment Act 1979*, all public reports that have been submitted are published in the NSW Department of Planning's active tracking system are put on public display at <http://majorprojects.planning.nsw.gov.au>.

Drawing on reports that had been lodged to the aforementioned website between 1 January 2007 and 31 October 2010, a purposive criterion sampling technique was used (Neuman, 2006). From the total overall available sample of major projects, each project with an available crime risk assessment report was collected. These reports were identified in and selected from the available file attachments and resources attached to a project that made specific reference to 'crime risk' or 'CPTED' in the title of the report, or as the title of the relevant appendix. Thus, we searched for specific criteria while making judgements about the capacity of a project to be subjected to our analysis. A total of 33 crime risk assessments reports were identified, and selected from this dataset. As is indicated in Table 1, this method of collection resulted in a good mix of both report author and development type.

We have decided to maintain the anonymity of the authors of these reports and to de-identify the development to which any report refers. Despite the fact that the reports were publicly available at the time of data collection (and are most likely still are publicly available) we see no advantage to the aims of this project in identifying these specific firms and developments. Rather, each report has been numbered and generic categories have been created and used to describe the nature of the individual or company responsible for preparing the reports and the type of development to which it refers (see Table 1).

A content analysis of these reports was conducted to provide an insight into the techniques and procedures used to produce crime risk assessment reports. Our coding protocol sought to

- (a) identify the methodology employed in the conduct of the crime risk assessment;
- (b) the type and scope of data referenced in each report;
- (c) the presence of recommendations, and;
- (d) whether any future commitments were present in the report.

This approach was chosen to enable a

structured, systematic process to identify patterns and trends in what is included, what meanings are being communicated, the type of vocabulary/images used to

Table 1: Report author and development type and length of report

<i>Report number</i>	<i>Author</i>	<i>Type of development</i>	<i>Report length (Pages)</i>
1	Social planning firm	Commercial mixed use	16
2	Social planning firm	Health-care facility	35
3	Engineering firm	Art and cultural facility	11
4	Engineering firm	Public thoroughfare	8
5	Property development company	Residential	4
6	Social planning firm	Residential	7
7	Social planning firm	Residential	35
8	Social planning firm	Residential	13
9	Property development company	Residential	4
10	Property development company	Residential	4
11	Crime prevention consultant	Residential	12
12	Property development company	Commercial	7
13	Property development company	Residential	4
14	Social planning firm	Commercial	24
15	Social planning firm	Residential	4
16	Planning firm	Health-care facility	10
17	Property development company	Residential mixed use	17
18	Crime prevention consultant	Residential mixed use	19
19	Planning firm	Residential mixed use	12
20	Crime prevention consultant	Residential mixed use	24
21	Architectural firm	Health-care facility	7
22	Architectural firm	Residential	2
23	Property development company	Residential mixed use	3
24	Social planning firm	Commercial mixed use	16
25	Architectural firm	Health-care facility	3
26	Architectural firm	Residential	4
27	Architectural firm	Licensed venue	14
28	Architectural firm	Licensed venue, mixed use residential	3
29	Crime prevention consultant	Residential	13
30	Crime prevention consultant	Commercial mixed use	15
31	Architectural firm	Health-care facility	11
32	Architectural firm	Residential	14
33	Architectural Firm	Residential	4

convey particular types of messages or how various types of messages are contextualised within their particular form of media. (Tewkesbury, 2009, p. 46)

In addition to enabling insight into patterns and trends in the analysis used across the sample, this process allows for stability in the coding procedure so that this analysis may be repeated in the future and consistently across other jurisdictions (Ross, 2008).

To ensure inter-coder reliability, two members of the research team separately coded each of the 33 reports. Where coding differences were found, these sections were discussed until complete agreement had been achieved.

For the current article, we are interested in what this analysis tells us about the NSW guidelines rather than the reports *per se*. For a detailed discussion of the findings from the review of the 33 crime risk assessment reports, see Clancey *et al* (2011).

Analysis of the NSW Guidelines

The following analysis of the NSW guidelines is informed by our analysis of crime risk assessment reports and review of the NSW guidelines and comparison with other comparable jurisdictions (that is Victoria). The key limitations of the guidelines are broken into four sections. The first section assesses the limitations of the particular version of CPTED concepts outlined; the second section assesses the limitations of particular CPTED principles to specific developments; the third section deals with the difficulties for local authorities in assessing crime risk reports; the final limitation discussed is the overall presentation of the guidelines and the lack of guidance that ensues.

Only four CPTED concepts

As has been stated, the NSW guidelines focus on four key CPTED concepts (surveillance, access control, territorial reinforcement and space management). By only focusing on four CPTED concepts, the guidelines restrict consideration of other principles and issues that might have greater relevance to a particular development. The following is taken from Report 16, which was developed for a health care facility.

This report has been prepared to detail the crime minimisation design mechanisms proposed within the development and assess these mechanisms in accordance with the four (4) crime prevention through environmental design principles. (Report 16, p. 10)

With medications and expensive medical equipment likely to be held on the premises, there might have been greater value in considering how the areas holding these items would be secured, rather than having generic CPTED considerations addressed in the crime risk assessment report. Only 17 of the 33 reports we analysed (51.5 per cent) included any recommendations about how crime risks could be mitigated or managed, while all 33 reports contained a generic explanation of the four CPTED principles contained in the guidelines.

Report 3 states the following:

The [name] development will integrate the four principles of surveillance, access control, territorial reinforcement and space management into the design and operation of the [development] so that it will successfully contribute to, and improve the existing environment within which it is located. (Report 3, p. 9)

Upon completion, this development is likely to house expensive cultural artifacts. While the four generic CPTED concepts have relevance, there might for example be greater value in considering specific security procedures or design features to protect these works. The report states that there will be a number of space management strategies adopted, including:

activity coordination, site cleanliness, rapid repair of vandalism and graffiti, replacement of damaged pedestrian and car park lighting and removal or refurbishment of decayed physical elements. (Report 3, p. 8)

There is no mention of the risk of theft of the valuable cultural artifacts, nor of security procedures for protecting these items. As indicated, the present guidelines do not demand analysis of specific crime risks linked to the function of the facility or development. Consequently, the crime risk assessment report, also using the generic language of CPTED in this limited way, address only the four generic CPTED concepts.

It is thus argued that the guidelines represent an overly narrow reading of CPTED. The contemporary academic literature imagines the need to include more than just these four general concepts contained in the NSW guidelines. Yet, one-third of the sample of crime risk assessment reports we analysed ($n=11$) did not reference any further documents other than the s79c guidelines themselves.²

Cozens *et al* (2005) include consideration of target hardening and image as key elements of CPTED, while Saville and Cleveland (1998, 2008) introduce social cohesion, connectivity, community culture and threshold capacity (known as second generation CPTED). Moreover, Schneider and Kitchen (2007) suggest that space syntax and new urbanism are also emerging concepts that have relevance in designing out crime. Although these theorists and perspectives differ in the detail, there is general consensus that first generation CPTED (which is what the four concepts used in the NSW guidelines have been referred to) does not capture key concepts relevant to designing neighbourhoods and communities. This suggests that there is room to broaden the key concepts covered by the guidelines to ensure that wider issues are considered than those covered by the four, first generation CPTED principles.

Existing concepts are not relevant in all circumstances

Some of the CPTED concepts contained in the guidelines will have little or no relevance to particular developments. For example, Report 4 states that;

‘the principle of access control has been omitted entirely from the assessment ... owing its lack of relevance to this development proposal’ (Report 4: 6).

This is likely to be true for many developments involving public space.

Further, at the stage in the development application process when crime risk assessments are generally conducted, there will often be little or no clear plan for future oriented space management regimes. Maintenance and activity coordination (practices generally linked to space management) will frequently be the responsibility of contractors that will be engaged closer to or after the completion of the development. Thirty (30) of the 33 reports (91.0 per cent) reference actions that should be carried out after these plans have been approved, with 27 of these of these commitments relating specifically to access control procedures and space management. The following excerpts highlight the lack of clear plans for the management of these issues at this stage of the development process:

‘The [development] management will include active surveillance in the form of security patrols and CCTV surveillance’. (Report 12: 6)

‘Aside from the passive surveillance provided through the design of the development, it is understood that [company name] will extend the security system which are currently in place’. (Report 31: 10)

‘My instructions are that an appropriate maintenance/security patrol program is catered for that will impact on the replacement of failed lighting, prompt removal of any graffiti and the utilisation of graffiti inhibiting surface coatings are to be used on the extremities of the development’. (Report 11: 10)

A local authority would have difficulty assessing these somewhat generic commitments and developers will be likely to resist establishing concrete plans for these issues before they have been granted approval for the proposed development. Consequently, of the four CPTED principles covered in the NSW guidelines, it is possible that only half (that is surveillance and territorial reinforcement) will be relevant to all developments.

Difficulties of assessing crime risk assessment reports

Given the broad descriptions of the four CPTED principles and the fact that in some situations only two of the principles will be relevant, the current NSW guidelines make it difficult for local authorities to review the crime risk assessment reports. As stated previously, the ‘guidelines can be used to justify:

- Modification of the development to minimise the risk of crime; or
- Refusal of the development on the grounds that crime risk cannot be appropriately minimised’ (DUAP, 2001, p. 2).

It is very difficult to see how the guidelines in their current form could be used to reject a development application. By using the vernacular of CPTED, it is

possible to connect almost any development proposal with the general CPTED principles. For example, Report 28 states the following under the heading – Territorial Reinforcement:

The overall design of this project links public and private spaces. The use of the bistro terrace and central courtyard are visually clear and only low stone walls define their boundaries. They are visually clear from public spaces and would attract anyone in distress. The fact that these active areas and building generally overlook public parkland will make it safer and encourage more evening use. (Report 28, p. 3)

It is very difficult to see how a local authority could interpret and assess such a sweeping statement. The use of the CPTED vernacular gives commentary like this the veneer of credibility and rationality, which might not in fact be supported by relevant empirical evidence, nor strict analysis of the architectural plans for the relevant proposed development (which here are absent).

Presentation of the guidelines

The NSW guidelines consist of five pages of text. There are no images, drawings, photos or illustrations to communicate design concepts. The CPTED concepts contained within the guidelines are explained by written text only. For example, the guidelines suggest that surveillance can be enhanced by providing clear sightlines, effective lighting and landscaping that reduces spots where offenders can hide or entrap victims (DUAP, 2001, p. 4). Territorial reinforcement will be achieved through ‘clear transitions and boundaries between public and private space’ (DUAP, 2001, p. 5).

These concepts can be difficult to interpret in purely written form. They lend themselves to being illustrated through diagrams, pictures or photos, which are formats that will be more familiar to built environment and design professionals, who will ordinarily have received little or no crime prevention training. While some Development Control Plans used by local consent authorities provide further information, the NSW guidelines do not.

Improving the NSW Guidelines

Many of the limitations highlighted here have been addressed in guidelines subsequently developed in other Australian (and international) jurisdictions. In our opinion, the *Safer Design Guidelines for Victoria*³ (Victorian Department of Sustainability and Environment, 2005) represent a particularly comprehensive approach to designing out crime. For this reason, they are contrasted here with the NSW guidelines.

The 65 pages of the *Safer Design Guidelines for Victoria* contain 178 design suggestions grouped across 10 design elements, including: neighbourhood

design, activity centres, building design, parks and open spaces, walking and cycle paths, public transport, car park areas, public facilities, lighting and signage. The following are just some of the design suggestions:

Cul-de-sacs should be no longer than 75 metres from entry to end. They should also be straight to maximize visibility from adjoining streets. (2005, p. 16)

Recesses in ground floor walls should be less than 0.3 metres deep to ensure they cannot be used as places to hide or entrap. (2005, p. 26)

Where landscaping is provided in public open spaces, or in adjacent streets or parks, ensure trees or vegetation do not block the field of vision between 0.7 metres and 2.4 metres above ground level. (2005, p. 33)

Ensure that paths are a minimum of 1.2 metres wide to allow pedestrians to walk two abreast. (2005, p. 36)

While not all of the 178 design suggestions contained in the Victorian guidelines are this specific, they do speak to designers and planners in ways that the general information in the NSW guidelines does not. Interpretation of the CPTED concepts included in the NSW guidelines can be disputed. Surveillance, for example, could be interpreted as a broad design goal or a narrow technical issue associated with the installation of a window in a particular location. Given the breadth of the four CPTED principles employed in the NSW guidelines, it becomes difficult to know how they can be assessed objectively. In contrast, it would be somewhat easier to determine if a proposed development included a cul-de-sac longer than 75 m or contained walkways less than 1.2 m in width.

The Victorian guidelines also speak to design and built environment professionals through the use of photos, sketches and drawings. For example, photos of street designs are provided to demonstrate how natural surveillance can be promoted. A diagram illustrates how a cul-de-sac should be designed, while aerial images show street layouts and the relationships between the hierarchy of streets. Photos also show micro-level detail, such as way-finding devices (signage), different lighting methods, bike and walking paths and the design and placement of public utilities, such as toilets and telephone boxes. In total, over 60 photos, 10 diagrams and two aerial images are used to illustrate specific design advice throughout the document.

These practices are now common to most CPTED guidelines (for example, the CPTED guidelines used in Scotland, England and Wales, New Zealand and various Australian jurisdictions all contain photos, images or diagrams to illustrate key design approaches). By using more visual cues and providing examples where CPTED has been incorporated into designs, these design guidelines are more likely to resonate and influence designers. These images

have greater potential to positively influence designers and planners, while also aiding local authorities determining if proposed developments have sought to minimise any potential crime risks.

While the Victorian (and other) design guidelines provide possible examples of how to improve CPTED practices in NSW, consideration must also be given to the actual experiences of practitioners and local authorities in using the guidelines in this and other jurisdictions. The very limited Australian research in this area makes it difficult to confidently assert how particular reforms would be received or adopted.

Conclusion

The NSW crime risk assessment guidelines were introduced in April 2001. The five pages of text explaining concepts such as surveillance, access control, territoriality and space management and provided limited direction to those developing crime risk assessments. By covering only four CPTED concepts, some of which are irrelevant in the context of particular developments, many important design features are not required to be considered. Coupled with the vague language used and limited direction provided in the guidelines, it is very difficult to see how local authorities can reasonably utilise the guidelines to assess crime risk assessment reports submitted as part of a development application. Definitional issues emerge, few commitments are made for which a developer or management company can be held responsible for and the use of CPTED vernacular tends to result in endorsement of a proposed development, rather than objective analysis. Consequently, it is argued that apart from triggering greater focus on CPTED, the NSW guidelines produce limited real outcomes. Revision of these guidelines is required if crime risks are to be identified and mitigated through the design and development processes.

Since the guidelines were introduced, almost all States and Territories in Australia have introduced similar guidelines. Unlike the NSW guidelines, other jurisdictions have created documents that are more likely to speak to architectural and design professionals. Through the use of diagrams, sketches and photos, guidelines outside of NSW provide much clearer direction regarding how CPTED can actually be adopted and practiced. The lessons learned from these jurisdictions should now inform the next stage of CPTED practice in NSW.

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Notes

- 1 The NSW Guidelines (at the time of writing) are available at: www.police.nsw.gov.au/_data/assets/pdf_file/0003/9390/duapguide_s79c.pdf.
- 2 Indeed, seven reports (21.2 per cent) did not present any crime data, demographic data, reference site plans, and did not contain evidence of any community consultations. However, it should be noted that this is not indicative of all reports, with six reports (18.2 per cent) presenting data in each of these areas and referencing other literature, and two-thirds ($n=22$) referencing at least one other literary source.
- 3 The Victorian Guidelines (at the time of writing) are available at: [www.land.vic.gov.au/CA256F310024B628/0/C967874075757D92CA2570350081F333/\\$File/Safer+Design+Guidelines.pdf](http://www.land.vic.gov.au/CA256F310024B628/0/C967874075757D92CA2570350081F333/$File/Safer+Design+Guidelines.pdf).

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